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This paper contrasts measures of teacher effectiveness with the students’ evaluations for the 
same teachers using administrative data from Bocconi University (Italy). The effectiveness 
measures are estimated by comparing the subsequent performance in follow-on coursework 
of students who are randomly assigned to teachers in each of their compulsory courses. We 
find that, even in a setting where the syllabuses are fixed and all teachers in the same course 
present exactly the same material, teachers still matter substantially. The average difference 
in subsequent performance between students who were assigned to the best and worst 
teacher (on the effectiveness scale) is approximately 43% of a standard deviation in the 
distribution of exam grades, corresponding to about 5.6% of the average grade. Additionally, 
we find that our measure of teacher effectiveness is negatively correlated with the students’ 
evaluations: in other words, teachers who are associated with better subsequent 
performance receive worst evaluations from their students. We rationalize these results with 
a simple model where teachers can either engage in real teaching or in teaching-to-the-test, 
the former requiring higher students’ effort than the latter. Teaching-to-the-test guarantees 
high grades in the current course but does not improve future outcomes. Hence, if students 
are myopic and evaluate better teachers from which they derive higher utility in a static 
framework, the model is capable of predicting our empirical finding that good teachers 
receive bad evaluations, especially when teaching-to-the-test is very effective (for example, 
with multiple choice tests). Consistently with the predictions of the model, we also find that 
classes in which high skill students are over-represented produce evaluations that are less at 
odds with estimated teacher effectiveness. 
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The use of anonymous students’ evaluations of professors to measure teachers’ performance
has become extremely popular in many universities around the world (Becker and Watts, 1999).
These normally include questions about the clarity of lectures, the logistics of the course, and
many others. They are either administered to the students during a teaching session toward the
end of the term or, more recently, ﬁlled on-line.
From the point of view of the university administration, such evaluations are used to solve
the agency problems related to the selection and motivation of teachers, in a context in which
neither the types of teachers, nor their levels of effort, can be observed precisely. In fact,
students’ evaluations are often used to inform hiring and promotion decisions (Becker and
Watts, 1999) and, in institutions that put a strong emphasis on research, to avoid strategic
behavior in the allocation of time or effort between teaching and research activities (Brown and
Saks, 1987).1
The validity of anonymous students’ evaluations as indicators of teacher ability rests on the
assumption that students are in a better position to observe the performance of their teachers.
While this might be true for the simple fact that students attend lectures, there are also many
reasons to question the appropriateness of such a measure. For example, the students’ objec-
tives might be different from those of the principal, i.e. the university administration. Students
may simply care about their grades, whereas the university (or parents or society as a whole)
cares about their learning and the two (grades and learning) might not be perfectly correlated,
especially when the same professor is engaged both in teaching and in grading the exams.
Consistently with this interpretation, Krautmann and Sander (1999) show that, conditional on
learning, teachers who give higher grades also receive better evaluations, a ﬁnding that is con-
ﬁrmed by several other studies and that is thought to be a key cause of grade inﬂation (Carrell
and West, 2010; Weinberg, Fleisher, and Hashimoto, 2009).
The estimation of teaching quality is complicated also becasuse it appears to be uncorre-
lated with the most common observable teachers’ characteristics, such as their qualiﬁcation or
1Although there is some evidence that a more research oriented faculty also improve academic and labor
market outcomes of graduate students (Hogan, 1981).
3experience (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006; Krueger, 1999; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 2005).
Despite such difﬁculties, there is also ample evidence that teachers’ quality matters substan-
tially in determining students achievement (Carrell and West, 2010; Rivkin, Hanushek, and
Kain, 2005) and that teachers respond to incentives (Duﬂo, Hanna, and Kremer, 2010; Figlio
and Kenny, 2007; Lavy, 2009). Hence, understanding how professors should (or should not)
be monitored and incentivized is of primary importance.
In this paper we evaluate the content of the students evaluations by contrasting them with
objective measures of teacher effectiveness. We construct such measures by comparing the
performance in subsequent coursework of students who are randomly allocated to different
teachers in their compulsory courses. For this exercise we use data on a cohort of students at
Bocconi University - the 1998/1999 freshmen - who were required to take a ﬁxed sequence of
compulsory courses and who whererandomly allocated to a set of teachers foreach compulsory
course. Additionally, the data are exceptionally rich in terms of observable characteristics, in
particular they include measures of cognitive ability and family income.2
We ﬁnd that, even in a setting where the syllabuses are ﬁxed and all teachers in the same
course present exactly the same material, professors still matter substantially. The average
difference in subsequent performance between students who were assigned to the best and
worst teacher (on the effectiveness scale) is approximately 15% of a standard deviation in the
distribution of exam grades, corresponding to over 2% of the average grade. Moreover, our
measureofteachingqualityappearstobenegativelycorrelatedwiththestudents’evaluationsof
the professors: in other words, teachers who are associated with better subsequent performance
receive worst evaluations from their students. On the other hand, teachers who are associated
with high grades in their own exams receive better evaluations.
We rationalize these results with a simple model where teaching is deﬁned as the combi-
nation of two types of activities: real teaching and teaching-to-the-test, the former requiring
higher students’ effort than the latter. Practically, we think of real teaching as competent pre-
sentations of the course material with the aim of making students understand it and master it,
and teaching-to-the-test as mere repetition of exam questions and exercises with the aim of
2The same data are used in De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli (2010).
4making students learn how to solve them, even without fully understanding their meaning.
Professors are heterogeneous in their teaching methodology, i.e. in the combination of real
teaching and teaching-to-the-test. Grades are the outcome of teaching and are less dispersed
the more the professor teaches to the test. The type of the exam deﬁnes the effectiveness of
teaching-to-the-test. To the one extreme, one can think of an exam as a selection of multiple-
choice questions randomly drawn from a given pool. In such a situation, teaching-to-the-test
merely consists in going over all the possible questions and memorizing the correct answers.
This is a setting in which teaching to the test can be very effective and lead to all students
performing very well, regardless of their ability. The other extreme are essays, where there is
no obvious correct answer and one needs to personally and originally elaborate on one’s own
understanding of the course material; in this type of exam teaching-to-the-test is unlikely to be
particularly effective.3
Students evaluate teachers on the basis of their utility levels, at least when they are asked
about their general satisfaction with the course. We assume that student’s utility depends posi-
tively on expected grades and negatively on effort. Further, we also introduce heterogeneity by
assuming that good students face a lower marginal disutility of effort.
This simple model is able to predict our empirical ﬁndings, namely that good teachers
get bad evaluations. This is more likely to occur with exam types that are more prone to
teaching-to-the-testandwhenlowabilitystudentsareover-represented. Consistentlywiththese
predictions, we also ﬁnd that the evaluations of classes in which high skill students (identiﬁed
by their score in the cognitive admission test) are over-represented are more in line with the
estimatedrealteacherquality. Furthermore, thedistributionsofgradesintheclassesofthemost
effective teachers are more dispersed, a piece of evidence that lends support to our speciﬁcation
of the learning function.
There is a large literature that investigates the role of teacher quality and teacher incentives
in improving educational outcomes, although most of the existing studies focus on primary
and secondary schooling (Figlio and Kenny, 2007; Jacob and Lefgren, 2008; Kane and Staiger,
2008; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004; Rockoff and Speroni, 2010; Tyler,
3Obviously, there are costs and beneﬁts to each type of exam. For example, multiple-choice tests can be
marked very quickly compared to essays. In this paper we abstract from these issues.
5Taylor, Kane, and Wooten, 2010). The availability of standardized test scores facilitates the
evaluation of teachers in primary and secondary schools and such tests are currently available
in many countries and also across countries (Mullis, Martin, Robitaille, and Foy, 2009; OECD,
2010). The large degree of heterogeneity in subjects and syllabuses in universities makes it
very difﬁcult to design common tests that would allow to compare the performance of students
who were exposed to different teachers, especially across subjects. At the same time, the large
increase in college enrollment experienced in almost all countries around the world in the past
decades (OECD, 2008) calls for a speciﬁc focus on higher education, as in this study.4
To the best of our knowledge, only three other papers investigate the role of students’ eval-
uations in university, namely Carrell and West (2010), Hoffman and Oreopoulos (2009) and
Weinberg, Fleisher, and Hashimoto (2009). Compared to these papers we improve in various
directions. First of all, the random allocation of students to teachers in our setting differenti-
ates our approach from that of Hoffman and Oreopoulos (2009) and Weinberg, Fleisher, and
Hashimoto (2009), who cannot purge their estimates from the potential bias due to the best
students selecting the courses of the best professors. Rothstein (2009) and Rothstein (2010)
show that correcting such a selection bias is pivotal to producing reliable measures of teach-
ing quality. The study of Carrell and West (2010) uses data from a U.S. Air Force Academy,
while our empirical application is based on a more standard institution of higher education and
it is therefore more likely to be generalizable to other settings.5 Moreover, we also provide a
theoretical framework for the interpretation of our results, which is absent in Carrell and West
(2010).
More generally, this paper is also related and contributes to the wider literature on perfor-
mance measurement and performance pay. For example, one concern with students’ evalua-
4On average in the OECD countries 56% of school-leavers enrolled in tertiary education in 2006 versus 35%
in 1995. The same secular trends appear in non-OECD countries. Further, the number of students enrolled in
tertiary education has increased on average in the OECD countries by almost 20% between 1998 and 2006, with
the US having experienced a higher than average increase from 13 to 17 millions.
5Bocconi is a selective college that offers majors in the wide area of economics, management, public policy
and law, hence it is likely comparable to US colleges in the mid-upper part of the quality distribution. For example,
faculty in the economics department hold PhDs from Harvard, MIT, NYU, Stanford, UCLA, LSE, Pompeu Fabra,
Stockholm University. Recent top Bocconi PhD graduates landed jobs (either tenure track positions or post-docs)
at the World Bank and the University College of London. Also, the Bocconi Business school is normally ranked
in the same range as the Georgetown University McDonough School of Business or the Johnson School at Cornell
University in the US and to the Manchester Business School or the Warwick Business School in the UK (see the
Financial Times Business Schools Rankings).
6tions of teachers is that they might divert professors from activities that have a higher learning
content for the students (but that are more demanding in terms of students’ effort) and concen-
trate more on classroom entertainment (popularity contests) or change their grading policies.
This interpretation is consistent with the view that teaching is a multi-tasking job, which makes
the agency problem more difﬁcult to solve (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994). Subjective evalu-
ations, which have become more and more popular in modern human resource practices, can be
seen as a mean to address such a problem and, given the very limited extant empirical evidence
(Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994; Prendergast and Topel, 1996), our results can certainly
inform also this area of the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and the institutional details
of Bocconi University. Section 3 presents our strategy to estimate teacher effectiveness and
shows the results. In Section 4 we correlate teacher effectiveness with the students’ evaluations
of professors. Robustness checks are reported in Section 5. In Section 6 we present a simple
theoretical framework that rationalizes our results, while Section 7 discusses some additional
evidence that corroborates our model. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Data and institutional details
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on data for one enrollment cohort of undergrad-
uate students at Bocconi university, an Italian private institution of tertiary education offering
degree programs in economics, management, public policy and law. We select the cohort of
the 1998/1999 freshmen for technical reasons, being the only one available in our data where
students were randomly allocated to teaching classes for each of their compulsory courses.6
In later cohorts, the random allocation was repeated at the beginning of each academic year,
so that students would take all the compulsory courses of each academic year with the same
group of classmates, which only permits to identify the joint effectiveness of the entire set of
6The terms class and lecture often have different meanings in different countries and sometimes also in dif-
ferent schools within the same country. In most British universities, for example, lecture indicates a teaching
session where an instructor - typically a full faculty member - presents the main material of the course; classes are
instead practical sessions where a teacher assistant solves problem sets and applied exercises with the students.
At Bocconi there was no such distinction, meaning that the same randomly allocated groups were kept for both
regular lectures and applied classes. Hence, in the remainder of the paper we use the two terms interchangeably.
7teachers in each academic year.7 For earlier cohorts the class identiﬁers, which are the crucial
piece of information for our study, were not recorded in the university archives.
The students entering Bocconi in the 1998/1999 academic year were offered 7 differ-
ent degree programs, although only three of them attracted a sufﬁcient number of students
to require the splitting of lectures into more than one class: Management, Economics and
Law&Management8. Students in these programs were required to take a ﬁxed sequence of
compulsory courses for the entire duration of their ﬁrst two years, for a good part of their third
year and, in a few cases, also in their last year. Table 1 lists the exact sequence for each of
the three programs that we consider, breaking down courses by the term (or semester) in which
they were taught and by subject areas (classiﬁed with different colors: red for management,
black for economics, green for quantitative subjects, blue for law).9 In Section 3 we construct
measures of teacher effectiveness for the professors of these compulsory courses. We do not
consider elective subjects, as the endogenous self-selection of students would complicate the
identiﬁcation.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Most (but not all) of the courses listed in Table 1 were taught in multiple classes (see Sec-
tion 3 for details). The number of such classes varied across both degree programs and speciﬁc
courses. For example, Management was the degree program that attracted the most students
(over 85% in our cohort), who were normally divided into 8 to 10 classes for their compulsory
courses. Economics and Law&Management students were much fewer and were rarely allo-
cated to more than just two classes. Moreover, the number of classes also varied within degree
programs depending on the number of available teachers. For instance, in 1998/99 Bocconi did
not have a law department and all law professors were contracted from other nearby universi-
ties. Hence, the number of classes in law courses were normally fewer than in other subjects
7De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Woolston (2011) use data for these later cohorts for a study of class size.
8The other degree programs were Economics and Social Disciplines, Economics and Finance, Economics and
Public Administration.
9Notice that Economics and Management share exactly the same sequence of compulsory courses in the ﬁrst
three terms. Indeed, students in these two programs did attend these courses together and made a ﬁnal decision
about their major at the end of the third term. De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli (2010) study precisely this choice.
In the rest of the paper we abstract from this issue and we treat the two degree programs as entirely separated. In
the Appendix we present some robustness checks to justify this approach (see Figure A-2).
8(e.g. 4 in Management). Similarly, since the management department was (and still is) much
larger than the economics or the mathematics department, courses in the management areas
were normally split in more classes than courses in other subjects.
Regardless of the speciﬁc class to which students were allocated, they were all taught the
same material. In other words, all professors of the same course were required to follow exactly
the same syllabus, although some variations across degree programs were allowed (i.e. mathe-
maticswastaughtslightlymoreformallytoEconomicsstudentsthanLaw&Managementones).
Additionally, the exam questions were also the same for all students, regardless of their classes.
Speciﬁcally, one of the teachers in each course (normally a senior person) acted as a coordina-
tor for all the others, making sure that all classes progressed similarly during the term, deﬁning
changes in the syllabus and addressing speciﬁc problems that might have arisen. The coordina-
tor also prepared the exam paper, which was administered to all classes. Grading was usually
delegated to the individual teachers, each of them marking the papers of the students in his/her
own class, typically with the help of one or more teaching assistants. Before communicating
the marks to the students, the coordinator would check that there were no large discrepancies
in the distributions across teachers.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics that summarize the distributions of (compulsory)
courses and their classes across terms and degree programs. For example, in the ﬁrst term
Management students took 3 courses, divided into a total of 24 different classes: management
I, which was split into 10 classes; private law, 6 classes; mathematics, 8 classes. The table also
reports basic statistics (means and standard deviations) for the size of these classes.
Our data cover in details the entire academic history of the students in these programs, in-
cluding their basic demographics (gender, place of residence and place of birth), high school
leaving grades as well as the type of high school (academic or technical/vocational), the grades
in each single exam they sat at Bocconi together with the date when the exams were sat. Grad-
uation marks are observed for all non-dropout students.10 Additionally, all students took a
10The dropout rate, deﬁned as the number of students who, according to our data, do not appear to have com-
pleted their programs at Bocconi over the total size of the cohort, is just above 10%. Notice that some of these
9cognitive admission test as part of their application to the university and such test scores are
available in our data for all the students. Moreover, since tuition fees depend on family income,
this variable is also recorded in our dataset. Importantly, we also have access to the random
class identiﬁers that allow us to identify in which class each students attended each of their
courses.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics for the students in our data by degree pro-
gram. The vast majority of them were enrolled in the Management program (74%), while
Economics and Law&Management attracted 11% and 14%. Female students were gener-
ally under-represented in the student body (43% overall), apart from the degree program in
Law&Management. About two thirds of the students came from outside the province of Mi-
lan, which is where Bocconi is located, and such a share increased to 75% in the Economics
program. Family income was recorded in brackets and one quarter of the students were in the
top bracket, whose lower threshold was in the order of approximately 110,000 euros at current
prices. Students from such a wealthy background were under-represented in the Economics
program and over-represented in Law&Management. High school grades and entry test scores
(both normalized on the scale 0-100) provide a measure of ability and suggest that Economics
attracted the best students, a fact that is conﬁrmed by looking at university grades, graduation
marks and entry wages in the labor market.
Data on wages come from graduate surveys that we were able to match with the admin-
istrative records. Bocconi runs regular surveys of all alumni approximately one to one and a
half years since graduation. These surveys contain a detailed set of questions on labor market
experience, including employment status, occupation, and (for the employed) entry wages. As
it is common with survey data, not all contacts were successful but we were still able to match
almost 60% of the students in our cohort, a relatively good response rate for surveys.11
students might have transfered to another university or still be working towards the completion of their program,
whose formal duration was 4 years. In Section 5 we perform a robustness check to show that excluding the
dropouts from our calculations is irrelevant for our results.
11The response rates are highly correlated with gender, because of compulsory military service, and with the
graduation year, given that Bocconi has improved substantially over time in its ability to track its graduates. Until
the 1985 birth cohort, all Italian males were required to serve in the army for 10-12 months but were allowed to
10Finally, we complement our dataset with students’ evaluations of teachers. Towards the
end of each term (typically in the last week), students in all classes were asked to ﬁll an eval-
uation questionnaire during one lecture. The questions gathered students’ opinions about and
satisfaction with various aspects of the teaching experience, including the clarity of the lec-
tures, the logistics of the course, the handiness of the professor and so on. For each item in the
questionnaire, students answered on a scale from 0 (very negative) to 10 (very positive) or 1 to
5.
In order to allow students to evaluate their experience without fear of retaliation from the
teachers at the exam, such questionnaires are anonymous and it is impossible to match the
individual student with a speciﬁc evaluation of the teacher.12 However, each questionnaire
reports the name of the course and the class identiﬁer, so that we can attach average evaluations
to each class in each course. Figure A-1 in the Appendix shows, as an example, the ﬁrst page
of the evaluation questionnaire used in the academic year 1998-1999.13
In Table 4 we present some descriptive statistics of the answers to the evaluation question-
naires. We concentrate on a limited set of items, which we consider to be the most informative
and interesting, namely overall teaching quality, lecturing clarity, the teacher’s ability to gen-
erate interest in the subject, the logistic of the course and workload. These are the same items
that we analyze in more details in Section 4. The exact wording and scaling of the questions
are reported in Table A-4 in the Appendix.
The average valuation of overall teaching quality is around 7, with a relatively large stan-
dard deviation of 0.9 and minor variation across degree programs. Although differences are not
statisticallysigniﬁcant, professorsintheEconomicsprogramseemtoreceiveslightlybetterstu-
dents’ evaluations than their colleagues in Management and, even more, in Law&Management.
The same ranking holds for the other measures of teaching quality, namely the clarity of lec-
turing and the ability to generate interest in the subject. Economics compares slightly worse to
the other programs in terms of course logistics
postpone the service if enrolled in full time education. For college students, it was customary to enroll right after
graduation.
12We are not aware of any university in the world where the students evaluations of their teachers are not
anonymized.
13The questionnaires were changed slightly over time as new items were added and questions were slightly
rephrased. We focus on a subset of questions that are consistent over the period under consideration.
11[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Some of the evaluation items are, understandably, highly correlated. For example, the
correlation coefﬁcient between overall teaching quality and lecturing clarity is 0.89. The course
logistics and the ability of the teacher in generating interest for the subject are slightly less
strongly correlated with the core measures of teacher quality (around 0.5-0.6). Workload is
the least correlated with any other item (all correlation coefﬁcients are below 0.2). The full
correlation matrix is reported in Table A-5 in the Appendix.
2.1 The random allocation
In this section we present evidence that the random allocation of students into classes was
successful. De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli (2010) use data for the same cohort (although
for a smaller set of courses and programs) and provide similar evidence.
The randomization was (and still is) performed via a simple random algorithm that assigned
a class identiﬁer to each student, who were then instructed to attend the lectures for the speciﬁc
course in the class labeled with the same identiﬁer. The university administration adopted the
policy of repeating the randomization for each course with the explicit purpose of encouraging
wide interactions among the students.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Table 5 reports test statistics derived from regressions of the observable students’ charac-
teristics (by column) on class dummies and the full interaction of indicators for the degree
program and the course (with standard errors clustered at the level of the individual student).
The null hypothesis under consideration is the joint signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients on the class
dummies, which amounts to testing for the equality of the means of the observable variables
across classes. Notice that these are very restrictive tests, as it is sufﬁcient to have one un-
balanced class to make the test fail. Results show that the F statistics are never particularly
high, the highest value being 3.5. In most cases the null cannot be rejected at conventional
signiﬁcance levels. The only exception is residence from outside Milan, which is abnormally
low in two Management groups. Four outlier groups in the Economics program (out of the 72
12classes that we considered) also seem to have a particularly low presence of female students,
while high school grades appear slightly lower than average in 3 classes of the same program.
Overall, Table 5 suggests that the randomization was rather successful.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Testing the equality of means is not a sufﬁcient test of randomization for continuous vari-
ables. Hence, in Figure 1 we compare the distributions of our measures of ability (high school
grades and entry test scores) for the entire student body and for a randomly selected class in
each program. The ﬁgure evidently shows that the distributions are extremely similar and for-
mal Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests conﬁrm the visual impression.
Finally, inTable6weprovidefurtherevidencethatalsoteacherswererandomlyallocatedto
classes, by presenting results of regressions of teachers’ observable characteristics on classes’
observable characteristics. For this purpose, we estimate a system of 9 seemingly unrelated
simultaneous equations, where each observation is a class in a compulsory course. The depen-
dent variables are 9 teachers’ characteristics (age, gender, h-index, average citations per year
and 4 dummies for academic positions) and the regressors are the class characteristics listed
in the rows of the table.14 The reported statistics test the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcients
on each class characteristic are all jointly equal to zero in all the equations of the system. The
last row tests the hypothesis that the coefﬁcients on all regressors are all jointly zero in all
equations.15
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Results show that only for a few class characteristics the correlation with the teachers’
observables is signiﬁcant at conventional statistical levels, such as the share of students who
come from an academic high school (lyceums) or indicators for classes taught primarily in
the early morning or late evening. Overall, the results in Table 6 are broadly consistent with
random allocation.
14The h-index is a quality-adjusted measure of individual citations based on search results on Google Scholar.
It was proposed by Hirsch (2005) and it is deﬁned as follows: A scientist has index h if h of his/her Np papers
have at least h citations each, and the other (Np   h) papers have no more than h citations each.
15To construct the tests we use the small sample estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the system.
133 Estimating teacher effectiveness
Weuseperformancedataforourstudentstoestimatemeasuresofteachereffectiveness. Namely,
for each of the compulsory courses listed in Table 1 we compare the future outcomes of stu-
dents that attended those courses in different classes, under the assumption that students who
were taught by better professors will enjoy better outcomes later on. This approach is sim-
ilar to the value-added methodology that is more commonly used in primary and secondary
schools (Goldhaber and Hansen, 2010; Hanushek, 1979; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006, 2010;
Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 2005; Rothstein, 2009) but it departs from its standard version,
that uses contemporaneous outcomes and conditions on past performance, since we use future
performance to infer current teaching quality.16
One most obvious concern with the estimation of teacher quality is the non-random as-
signment of students to professors. For example, if the best students self-select themselves
into the classes of the best teachers, then estimates of teacher quality would be biased upward.
Rothstein (2009) shows that such a bias can be substantial even in well-speciﬁed models and
especially when selection is mostly driven by unobservabes.
We avoid these complications by exploiting the random allocation of students in our cohort
to different classes for each of their compulsory courses. For this same reason, we focus ex-
clusively on compulsory courses, as self-selection is an obvious concern for elective subjects.
Moreover, elective courses were usually taken by fewer students than compulsory ones, hence
they were usually taught in a single class.
We compute our measures of teacher effectiveness in two steps. First, we estimate the
conditionalmeanoffuturegrades(incompulsorycourses)ofstudentsineachclassaccordingto
thefollowingprocedure. Considerasetofstudentsenrolledindegreeprogramdandindexedby
i = 1;:::;Nd, where Nd is the total number of students in the program. In our application there
are three degree programs (d = f1;2;3g): Management, Economics and Law&Management.
Each student i attends a ﬁxed sequence of compulsory courses indexed by c = 1;:::;Cd, where
Cd is the total number of such compulsory courses in degree program d. In each course c the
16For this reason we prefer to use the label teacher effectiveness for our estimates. Carrell and West (2010) use
our same approach but stick to naming it value-added.
14student is randomly allocated to a class s = 1;:::;Sc, where Sc is the total number of classes
in course c. Denote by  2 Zc a generic (compulsory) course, different from c, which student i
attends in semester t  tc, where tc denotes the semester in which course c is taught.
Let yids denote the grade obtained by student i in course . To control for differences in the
distribution of grades across courses, yids is standardized at the course level. Then, for each
course c in each program d we run the following regression:
yids = dcs + Xi + ids (1)
where Xi is a vector of student-level characteristics including a gender dummy, a dummy for
whether the student is in the top income bracket, the entry test score and the high school leaving
grade. The ’s are our parameters of interest and they measure the conditional means of the
futuregradesofstudentsinclasss: highvaluesofindicatethat, onaverage, studentsattending
course c in class s performed better (in subsequent courses) than students taking course c in a
different class. The random allocation procedure guarantees that the class ﬁxed effects dcs in
equation 1 are purely exogenous and identiﬁcation is straightforward.17
Notice that, since in general there are several subsequent courses  for each course c, each
student is observed multiple times and the error terms ids are serially correlated within i and
across . We address this issue by adopting a standard random effect model to estimate all the
equations 1 (we estimate one such equation for each course c). Moreover, we further allow
cross-sectional correlation among the error terms of students in the same class by clustering the
standard errors at the class level. More formally, we assume that the error term is composed of
three additive components (all with mean equal zero):
ids = vi + !s + ids (2)
where vi and !s are, respectively, an individual and a class component, and ids is a purely
random term. Operatively, we ﬁrst apply the standard random effect transformation to the
17Notice that in few cases more than one teacher taught in the same class, so that our class effects capture the
overall effectiveness of teaching and cannot be attached to a speciﬁc person. Since the students’ evaluations are
also available at the class level and not for speciﬁc teachers, we cannot disaggregate further.
15original model of equation 1.18
In the absence of other sources of serial correlation (i.e if the variance of !s were zero), such
a transformation would lead to a serially uncorrelated and homoskedastic variance-covariance
matrix of the error terms, so that the standard random effect estimator could be produced by
running simple OLS on the transformed model. In our speciﬁc case, we further cluster the
transformed errors at the class level to account for the additional serial correlation induced by
the term !s.
Overall, we are able to estimate 230 such ﬁxed effects, the large majority of which are for
Management courses.19. Descriptive statistics of the estimated ’s are reported in Table A-1 in
the Appendix.
The second step of our approach is meant to purge the estimated ’s from the effect of
other class characteristics that might affect the performance of students in later courses but
are not attributable to teachers. By deﬁnition, the class ﬁxed effects capture all those features,
both observable and unobservable, that are ﬁxed for all students in the class. These certainly
include teaching quality but also other factors that are documented to be important ingredients
of the education production function, such as class size and class composition (De Giorgi,
Pellizzari, and Woolston, 2011). A key advantage of our data is that most of these other factors
are observable. In particular, based on our academic records we can construct measures of
both class size and class composition (in terms of students’ characteristics). Additionally, we
also have access to the identiﬁers of the teachers in each class and we can recover a large
set of variables like gender, tenure status, and measures of research output. We also know
which of the several teachers in each course acted as coordinator. These are the same teacher
characteristics that we used in Table 6. Once we condition on all these observable controls,
18The standard random effect transformation subtracts from each variable in the model (both the dependent







v, where jZcj is the
cardinality of Zc. For example, the random-effects transformed dependent variable is yids  yids, where yids =
jZcj 1 PjZcj
h=1 yidh. Similarly for all the regressors. The estimates of 2
v and (2
! + 2
) that we use for this
transformation are the usual Swamy-Arora, also used by the command xtreg in Stata (Swamy and Arora, 1972).
19We cannot run equation 1 for courses that have no contemporaneous nor subsequent courses, such
as Corporate Strategy for Management, Banking for Economics and Business Law for Law&Management
(see Table 1). For such courses, the set Zc is empty. Additionally, some courses in Economics and in
Law&Management are taught in one single class, for example Econometrics (for Economics students) or Statistics
(for Law&Management). For such courses, we have Sc = 1. The evidence that we reported in Tables 5 and 6 also
refer to the same set of 230 classes.
16unobservable teaching quality is likely to be the only remaining factor that generates variation
in the estimated ’s. At a minimum, it should be uncontroversial that teaching quality is by far
the single most important unobservable that generates variation in the estimated class effects.
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
Thus, in Table 7 we regress the estimated ’s on all observable class and teacher charac-
teristics. In column 1 we condition only on class size and class composition, in column 2 only
on information about the teachers and in column 3 we combine the two sets of controls. In all
cases we weight observations by the inverse of the standard error of the estimated ’s to take
into account differences in the precision of such estimates. Consistently with previous stud-
ies on the same data (De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Woolston, 2011), we ﬁnd that larger classes
tend to be associated with worse learning outcomes, that classes with more able students, mea-
sured with either high school grades or the entry test score, also perform better and that a high
concentration of high income students appears to be detrimental for learning. Overall, observ-
able class characteristics explain about 42% of the variation in the estimated ’s within degree
program, term and subject cells.20
The results in column 2 show a non linear relationship between teachers’ age and teaching
outcomes, which might be rationalized with increasing returns to experience. Also, profes-
sors who are more productive in research seem to be less effective as teachers, when output is
measured with the h-index. The effect is reversed using yearly citations but it never reaches
acceptable levels of statistical signiﬁcance. Finally, and consistently with the age effect, also
the professor’s academic position matters, with a ranking that gradually improves from assis-
tant to associate to full professors (other academic positions, such as external or non tenured-
track teachers, are the excluded group). However, as in Hanushek and Rivkin (2006); Krueger
(1999), we ﬁnd that the individual traits of the teachers explain slightly more than one third of
the variation within degree program, term and subject cells. Overall, the complete set of ob-
servable class and teachers’ variables explains approximately 57% of the (residual) variation.
Our ﬁnal measures of teacher effectiveness are the residuals of the regression of the esti-
20The Partial R-squared reported at the bottom of the table refer to the R-squared of a partitioned regression
where the dummies for the degree program, the term and the subject are partialled out.
17mated ’s on all the observable variables, i.e the regression reported in column 3 of Table 7. In
Table 8 we present descriptive statistics of such measures.
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
The overall standard deviation of teacher effectiveness is 0.174. This average is the com-
position of a larger variation among the courses of the program in Law&Management (0.220)
and a slightly more limited variation in Management (0.160) and Economics (0.144). Recall
that grades are normalized so that the distributions of the class effects are comparable across
courses. Hence, these results can be directly interpreted in terms of changes in outcomes. In
other words, the overall effect of increasing teacher effectiveness by one standard deviation is
an increase in the average grade of subsequent courses by 0.174 standard deviations, roughly
0.6 of a grade point or 2.3% over the average grade of approximately 26.21 Given an estimated
conditional elasticity of entry wages to GPA of 0.45, such an effect would cost students slightly
more than 1% of their average entry monthly wage of 967 euros, almost 10 euros per month or
120-130 euros per year.22 Since in our data we only observe entry wages, it might well be that
the long term effects of teaching quality are even larger.
In Table 8 we also report the standard deviations of teacher effectiveness of the courses with
the least and the most variation to show that there is substantial heterogeneity across courses.
Overall, we ﬁnd that in the course with the highest variation (management I in the Economics
program) the standard deviation of our measure of effectiveness is approximately one third of a
standard deviation in grades. This compares to a standard deviation of essentially zero (0.003)
in the course with the lowest variation (accounting in the Law&Management program).
In the lower panel of Table 8 we report the mean (across courses) of the difference between
the largest and the smallest indicators of teacher effectiveness, which allows us to compute
the effect of attending a course in the class of the best versus the worst teacher. On average,
21In Italy, university exams are graded on a scale 0 to 30, with pass equal to 18. Such a peculiar grading scale
comes from historical legacy: while in primary, middle and high school students were graded by one teacher per
subject on a scale 0 to 10 (pass equal to 6), at university each exam was supposed to be evaluated by a commission
of three professors, each grading on the same 0-10 scale, the ﬁnal mark being the sum of these three. Hence, 18 is
pass and 30 is full marks. Apart from the scaling, the actual grading at Bocconi is performed as in the average US
or UK university.
22In Italy wages are normally paid either 13 or 14 times over the year, once every month plus one additional
payment around mid December (tredicesima) and around mid June (quattordicesima).
18this effect amounts to 0.427 of a standard deviation, that is almost 1.5 grade points or 5.6%
over the average grade. As already noted above, this average effect masks a large degree of
heterogeneity across subjects ranging from almost 1 full standard deviation to a mere 0.4% of
a standard deviation.
To further understand the importance of these effects, we can also compare particularly
lucky students, who are assigned to good teachers (deﬁned as those in the top 5% of the distri-
bution of effectiveness) for all their compulsory courses, to particularly unlucky students, who
are always assigned to bad teachers (deﬁned as those in the bottom 5% of the distribution of
effectiveness). The average grades of these two groups of students are 1.6 standard deviations
apart, corresponding to over 5.5 grade points. Based on our estimate of the wage elasticity, this
difference translates into a sizable 1,100-1,200 euros per year (93.2 euros/month) or 9.6% over
the average.
For robustness and comparison, we estimate the class effects in two alternative ways. First,
we restrict the set Zc to courses belonging to the same subject area of course c, under the
assumption that good teaching in one course is likely to have a stronger effect on learning in
courses of the same subject areas (e.g. a good basic mathematics teacher is more effective in
improving students performance in ﬁnancial mathematics than in business law). The subject
areas are deﬁned by the colors in Table 1 and correspond to the department that was responsible
for the organization and teaching of the course. We label these estimates subject effects. Given
the more restrictive deﬁnition of Zc we can only produce these estimates for a smaller set of
courses and using fewer observation, which is the reason why we do not take them as our
benchmark.
Next, rather than using performance in subsequent courses, we run equation 1 with the
grade in the same course c as the dependent variable. We label these estimates contempora-
neous effects. We do not consider these contemporaneous effects as alternative and equivalent
measures of teacher effectiveness, but we will use them to show that they correlate very differ-
ently with the students’ evaluations. Descriptive statistics for the subject and contemporaneous
effects are reported in Tables A-2 and A-3 in the Appendix.
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]
19In Table 9 we investigate the correlation between these alternative estimates of teacher ef-
fectiveness. Speciﬁcally, we report results from weighted OLS regressions with our benchmark
estimates as the dependent variable and, in turn, the subject and the contemporaneous effects
on the right hand side, together with dummies for degree program, term and subject area.23
Reassuringly, the subject effects are positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with our bench-
mark, while the contemporaneous effects are negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated with our
benchmark, a result that is consistent with previous ﬁndings (Carrell and West, 2010; Kraut-
mann and Sander, 1999; Weinberg, Fleisher, and Hashimoto, 2009) and to which we will return
in Section 4.
4 Correlating teacher effectiveness and student evaluations
In this section we investigate the relationship between our measures of teaching effectiveness
from Section 3 and the evaluations received by the same teachers from their students. We
concentrate on two core items from the evaluation questionnaires, namely overall teaching
quality and the overall clarity of the lectures. Additionally, we also look at other items: the
teacher’s ability in generating interest for the subject, the logistics of the course (schedule
of classes, combinations of practical sessions and traditional lectures) and the total workload
compared to other courses.
Formally, we estimate the following equation:
q
k
dtcs = 0 + 1b dtcs + 2Cdtcs + 3Tdtcs + d + t + c + dtcs (3)
where qk
dtcs is the average answer to question k in class s of course c in the degree program
d (which is taught in term t), b dtcs is the estimated class ﬁxed effect, Cdtcs is the set of class
characteristics, Tdtcs is the set of teacher characteristics. d, t and c are ﬁxed effects for degree
program, term and subject areas, respectively. dtcs is a residual error term.
Notice that the class and teacher characteristics are exactly the same as in Table 7, so that
23To take into account the additional noise due to the presence of generated regressors on the right hand side
of these models, the standard errors are bootstrapped. Further, each observation is weighted by the inverse of the
standard error of the dependent variable, which is also a generated variable.
20equation 3 is equivalent to a partitioned regression model of the evaluations qdtcs on our mea-
sures of teacher effectiveness, i.e. the residuals of the regressions in Table 7, where all the
observables and the ﬁxed effects are partialled out.
Since the dependent variable in equation 3 is an average, we estimate it using weighted
OLS, where each observation is weighted by the square root of the number of collected ques-
tionnaires in the class, which corresponds to the size of the sample over which the average
answers are taken. Additionally, we also bootstrap the standard errors to take into account the
presence of generated regressors (the b s).
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]
The ﬁrst four columns of Table 10 reports the estimates of equation 3 for a ﬁrst set of core
evaluation items, namely overall teaching quality and lecturing clarity. For each of these items
we show results obtained using our benchmark estimates of teacher effectiveness and those
obtained using the contemporaneous class effects.
Results show that our benchmark class effects are negatively associated with all the items
that we consider. In other words, teachers who are more effective in promoting future perfor-
mance receive worst evaluations from their students. This relationship is statistically signiﬁcant
for all items (but logistics), and are of sizable magnitude. For example, one standard deviation
increase in teacher effectiveness reduces the students evaluations of overall teaching quality by
about 40% of a standard deviation. Such an effect could move a teacher who would otherwise
receive a median evaluation down to the 29th percentile of the distribution. Effects of very
similar magnitude can be computed for lecturing clarity.
Consistently with the ﬁndings of other studies (Carrell and West, 2010; Krautmann and
Sander, 1999; Weinberg, Fleisher, and Hashimoto, 2009), when we use the contemporaneous
effects(evencolumns)theestimatedcoefﬁcientsturnpositiveandhighlystatisticallysigniﬁcant
for all items (but workload). In other words, the teachers of classes that are associated with
higher grades in their own exam receive better evaluations from their students. The magnitude
of these effects is only marginally smaller than those estimated for our benchmark measures:
one standard deviation change in the contemporaneous teacher effect increases the evaluation
21of overall teaching quality by 33% of a standard deviation and the evaluation of lecturing clarity
by 32%.
The results in Table 10 clearly challenge the validity of students’ evaluations of professors
as a measure of teaching quality. Even abstracting from the possibility that professors strategi-
cally adjust their grades to please the students (a practice that is made difﬁcult by the timing of
the evaluations, that are always collected before the exam takes place), it might still be possible
that professors who make the classroom experience more enjoyable do that at the expense of
true learning or fail to encourage students to exert effort. Alternatively, students might reward
teachers who prepare them for the exam, that is teachers who teach to the test, even if this
is done at the expenses of true learning. This interpretation is consistent with the results in
Weinberg, Fleisher, and Hashimoto (2009), who provide evidence that students are generally
unaware of the value of the material they have learned in a course, and it is the interpretation
that we adopt to develop the theoretical framework of Section 6.
Of course, one may also argue that students’ satisfaction is important per se and, even,
that universities should aim at maximizing satisfaction rather than learning, especially private
institutions like Bocconi. We doubt that this is the most common understanding of higher
education policy.
5 Robustness checks
In this section we present robustness checks for our main results in Sections 3 and 4.
First, we investigate the role of students’ dropout in the estimation of our measures of
teacher effectiveness. In our main empirical analysis students who do not have a complete
academic record are excluded. These are students who either dropped out of higher education
or have transfered to another university or are still working towards the completion of their
programs, whose formal duration was 4 years. They total about 10% of all the students who
enrolled in their ﬁrst year in 1998-1999. In order to check that excluding them does not affect
our main results, in Figure 2 we compare our benchmark measure of teacher effectiveness
estimated in Section 3 with similar estimates that include such dropout students, conditioning
22on degree program effects. As it is evident, the two sets of estimates are very similar and
regressing one over the other (controlling for degree program, term and subject ﬁxed effects)
yields an R2 of over 88%. Importantly, there does not seem to be larger discrepancies between
the two versions of the class effects for the best or the worst teachers.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Second, one might be worried that students might not comply with the random assignment
to the classes. For various reasons they may decide to attend one or more courses in a different
class from the one to which they were formally allocated. For example, they may desire to
stay with their friends, who might have been assigned to a different class, or they may like a
speciﬁc teacher, who is known to present the subject particularly clearly. Unfortunately, such
changes would not be recorded in our data, unless the student formally asked to be allocated to
a different class, a request that needed to be adequately motivated.24 Hence, we cannot exclude
a priori that some students switch classes.
If the process of class switching is unrelated to teaching quality, then it merely affects the
precision of our estimated class effects, but it is very well possible that students switch in search
for good or lenient lecturers. We can get some indication of the extent of this problem from
the students’ answers to an item of the evaluation questionnaires that asks about the congestion
in the classroom. Speciﬁcally, the question asks whether the number of students in the class
was detrimental to one’s learning. We can, thus, identify the most congested classes from the
average answer to such question in each course.
Courses in which students concentrate in the class of one or few professors should be char-
acterized by a very skewed distribution of such a measure of congestion, with one (or a few)
classes being very congested and the others being pretty empty. Thus, for each course we com-
pute the difference in the congestion indicator between the most and the least congested classes
(over the standard deviation). Courses in which such difference is very large should be the ones
that are more affected by switching behaviors.
24Possible motivations for such requests could be health reasons. For example, due to a broken leg a student
might not be able to reach classrooms in the upper ﬂoors of the university buildings and could ask to be assigned
to a class taught on the ground ﬂoor.
23[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE]
In Table 11 we replicate our benchmark estimates for the two core evaluation items (overall
teaching quality and lecturing clarity) by excluding the most switched course (Panel B), i.e.
the course with the largest difference between the most and the least congested classes (which
is marketing). For comparison we also report the original estimates from Table 10 in Panel
A and we ﬁnd that results change only marginally. Next, in Panel C and D we exclude from
the estimates also the second most switched course (human resource management) and the
ﬁve most switched courses, respectively.25 Again, the estimated coefﬁcients are only mildly
affected, although the signiﬁcance levels are reduced according with the smaller sample sizes.
Overall, this exercise suggests that course switching should not affect our estimates in any
major direction.
Finally, one might be worried that our results may be generated by some endogenous reac-
tion of students to the quality of their past teachers. For example, as one meets a bad teacher
in one course one might be induced to exert higher effort in the future to catch up, especially
if bad teaching resulted in a lower (contemporaneous) grade. Hence, the students evaluations
may reﬂect real teaching quality and our measure of teacher effectiveness would be biased by
such a process of mean reversion, leading to a negative correlation with real teaching quality
and, consequently, also with the evaluations of the students.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
To control for this potential feedback effect on students’ effort, we recompute our bench-
mark measures of teacher effectiveness adding the student average grade in all previous courses
to the set of controls. Figure 3 compares our benchmark teacher effectiveness with this aug-
mented version, conditioning on the usual ﬁxed effects for degree program, term and subject
area and shows that the two are strongly correlated (even accounting for the outliers).
25The ﬁve most switched courses are marketing, human resource management, mathematics for Economics and
Management, ﬁnancial mathematics and managerial accounting.
246 Interpreting the results: a simple theoretical framework
We think of teaching as the combination of two types of activities: real teaching and teaching-
to-the-test. The ﬁrst consists of presentations and discussions of the course material and leads
to actual learning, conditional on the students exerting effort; the latter is aimed at maximizing
performance in the exam, it requires lower effort by the students and it is not necessarily related
to actual learning.
Practically, we think of real teaching as competent presentations of the course material
with the aim of making students understand and master it and of teaching-to-the-test as mere
repetition of exam tests and exercises with the aim of making students learn how to solve them,
even without fully understanding their meaning.
Consider a setting in which teachers are heterogenous in their preference (or ability) to do
real teaching. We measure such heterogeneity with a parameter j 2 [0;1], such that a teacher
j with j = 0 exclusively teaches to the test and a teacher with j = 1 exclusively engages in
real teaching.
The grade xi of a generic student i in the course taught by teacher (or in class) j is deﬁned
by the following production function:
xi = jh(ei) + (1   j)x (4)
which is a linear combination of a function h() of student’s effort ei and a constant x, weighted
by the teacher’s type j. We assume h() to be a continuous and twice differentiable concave
function. Under full real teaching (j = 1) grades vary with students’ effort; on the other
hand, if the teacher exclusively teaches to the test (j = 0), everyone gets the same grade x,
regardless of effort. This strong assumption can obviously be relaxed and all our implications
will be maintained as long as the gradient of grades to effort increases with j, the extent of
real teaching.
The parameter x measures the extent to which the exam material and the exam format
lend themselves to teaching-to-the-test. To the one extreme, one can think of the exam as a
selection of multiple-choice questions randomly drawn from a large pool. In such a situation,
25teaching-to-the-test merely consists in going over all the possible questions, memorizing the
correct answer. This is a setting which would feature a large x. The other extreme are essays,
where there is no obvious correct answers and one needs to personally and originally elaborate
on one’s own understanding of the course material. Of course, there are costs and beneﬁts
to each type of exam and multiple-choice tests are often adopted because they can be marked
quickly, easily and uncontroversially. For the sake of simplicity, however, we abstract from
these considerations.
For simplicity, equation 4 assumes that teaching-to-the-test does not require students to
exert effort. All our results would be qualitatively unchanged under the weaker assumption
that teaching-to-the-test requires less effort by the students. We also assume that j is a ﬁxed
characteristic of teacher j, so that the model effectively describes the conditions for identifying
teachers of different types, a key piece of information for hiring and promotion decisions.
Alternatively, j could be treated as an endogenous variable under the control of the individual
teacher, in which case the model would feature a rather standard agency problem where the
university tries to provide incentives to the teachers to choose a j close to 1. Although, such
a model would be considerably more complicated than what we present in this section, its
qualitative results would be unchanged and the limited information on teachers in our data
would make its additional empirical content redundant in our setting.
More speciﬁcally, one could model j as an endogenous choice of the teacher and generate
heterogeneity by assuming that different activities (real teaching or teaching-to-the-test) require
different efforts from the professors, who face heterogeneous marginal disutilities. Such an al-
ternativemodelwouldfeaturebothadverseselectionandmoralhazardandpropermeasurement
of teaching quality could help addressing both issues, by facilitating the identiﬁcation of low
quality agents (high disutility of effort) and by incentivizing effort. In our simpliﬁed frame-
work, only adverse selection of professors takes place, but the general intuition holds also in a
more complicated setting.
In all cases, a key assumption is that j is unobservable by the university administrators
(the principal) and, although it might be observable to the students, cannot be credibly commu-
nicated to third parties.
26Assume now that students care about their grades but dislike exerting effort, so that the
utility function of a generic student i can be written as follows:







where i is a measure of student’s ability. For simplicity, we assume that students are perfectly
informed about the production function of grades, i.e. they know the type of their teacher,
they know the return to their effort and there is no additional stochastic component to equation
4. This assumption can be easily relaxed by introducing either imperfect information about
the teacher’s type or the exact speciﬁcation of the production function and, consequently, by
rewriting the utility function 5 in expected terms. The main intuition of our results would be
unchanged. Although the perfect information assumption is obviously a modeling device and
does not correspond to reality, we do believe that students know a lot about their professors,
either through conversations with older students or by observation through the duration of the
course.
The quasi-linearity of equation 5 simpliﬁes the algebra of the model. Alternatively, we
could have introduced some curvature in the utility function and assumed a linear production
process without affecting the results. With non-linearities both in the production and in the util-
ity functions one would have to make explicit a number of additional assumptions to guarantee
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Students choose their optimal level of effort e

























27Equation 7 shows that more able students exert higher effort. Equation 8 shows that more real
teaching induces higher effort from the students and equation 9 indicates that such an effect is
larger for the more able students 26
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Deﬁne e the level of effort such that h(e) = x. Moreover, since for a given j there is a unique








< 0 if i <  (12)
Equations 11 and 12 are particularly important under the assumption that, especially when
answering questions about the overall quality of a course, students give a better evaluation to
teachers (or classes) that are associated with a higher level of utility. Equations 11 and 12
suggest that high ability students evaluate better teachers or classes that are more focused on
real learning while low ability students prefer teachers that teach to the test. Hence, if the
(benchmark) teacher effects estimated in Section 3 indeed measure the real learning value of a
class (j, in the terminology of our model), we expect to see a more positive (or less negative)
correlation between such class effects and the students’ evaluations in those classes where the
concentration of high ability students is higher.
7 Further evidence
In this section we present two additional pieces of evidence that are consistent with the impli-
cations of the model of Section 6.
First, our speciﬁcation of the production function for exam grades in equation 4 implies a
26In the more complicated setting in which j is an endogenous choice of the teacher, equation 9 shows that
teachers’ and students’ effort are complement.
28positive relationship between grade dispersion and the professor’s propensity to engage in real
teaching (j). In our empirical exercise our measures of teacher effectiveness can be interpreted
as measures of the j’s in the terminology of the model. Hence, if grades were more dispersed
in the classes of the worst teachers one would have to question our speciﬁcation of equation 4.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
In Figure 4 we plot the coefﬁcient of variation of grades in each class (on the vertical axis)
against our measure of teacher effectiveness (on the horizontal axis). To take proper account
of differences across degree programs, the variables on both axes are the residuals of weighted
OLS regressions that condition on degree program, term and subject area ﬁxed effects, as in
standard partitioned regressions (the weight is the squared root of classes’ size). Consistently
with equation 4 in our model, the two variables are positively correlated and such a correlation
is statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels: a simple univariate OLS regression of the
variable on the vertical axis on the variable on the horizontal axis yields a coefﬁcient of 0.007
with a standard error of 0.003.
[INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE]
Next, according to equations 11 and 12, we expect the correlation between our measures of
teacher effectiveness and the average student evaluations to be less negative in classes where
the share of high ability students is higher. This is the hypothesis that we investigate in Table
12. We deﬁne as high ability those students who score in the upper quartile of the distribution of
the entry test score and, for each class in our data, we compute the share of such students. Then,
we investigate the relationship between the students’ evaluations and teacher effectiveness by
restricting the sample to classes in which high-ability students are over-represented. Results
seem to suggest the presence of non linearities or threshold effects, as the estimated coefﬁcient
remains relatively stable until the fraction of high ability students in the class goes above 25%.
At that point, the estimated effect of teacher effectiveness on students’ evaluations is about
a third of the one estimated on the entire sample, and it is not statistically different from zero
(although this is also due to the smaller sample size). The results, thus, suggest that the negative
29correlations reported in Table 10 are mostly due to classes with a particularly low incidence of
high ability students.
8 Conclusions
Using administrative archives from Bocconi University and exploiting random variation in stu-
dents’ allocation to teachers within courses we ﬁnd that, on average, students evaluate posi-
tively classes that give high grades and negatively classes that are associated with high grades
in subsequent courses. These empirical ﬁndings can be rationalized with a simple model fea-
turing heterogeneity in the preferences (or ability) of teachers to engage in real teaching rather
than teaching-to-the-test, with the former requiring higher effort from students than the latter.
Overall, our results cast serious doubts on the validity of students’ evaluations of professors as
measures of teaching quality or effort.
At the same time, the strong effects of teaching quality on students’ outcomes, as docu-
mented in Section 3, suggest that improving the quantity or the quality of professors’ inputs
in the education production function can lead to large gains. Under the interpretation offered
by our model in Section 6, this could be achieved through various types of interventions. For
example, one may think of adopting exam formats that reduce the returns to teaching-to-the-
test, although this may come at larger costs due to the additional time needed to grade less
standardized tests.
Alternatively, one may stick to the use of students’ evaluations to measure teachers’ perfor-
mance but limit the extent of grade leniency that may be induced in such a system, for example
by making sure that teaching and grading are done by different persons. Anecdotically, we
know that at Bocconi it is common practice among the teachers of the core statistics course to
randomize the grading, i.e. at the end of the course the teachers of the different classes are ran-
domly assigned the papers of another class for marking. In the only year in which this practice
was abandoned, average grades increased substantially.
Another variation to the current most common use of the students’ evaluations consists in
postponing the collection of students’ opinions, so as to give them time to appreciate the value
30of real teaching in subsequent learning (or even in the market). Obviously, this would also pose
problems in terms of recall bias and possible retaliation for low grading.
Alternatively, one may also think of alternative forms of performance measurement that are
more in line with the peer-review approach adopted in the evaluation of research output. It is
already common practice in several departments to have colleagues sitting in some classes and
observing teacher performance, especially of assistant professors. This is often done primarily
with the aim of offering advise, but in principle it could also be used to measure outcomes.
An obvious concern is that one could change behavior due to the presence of the observer. A
slightly more sophisticated version of the same method could be based on the use of cameras
to record a few teaching sessions during the course without the teacher knowing exactly which
ones. The video recordings could then be viewed and evaluated by an external professor in the
same ﬁeld.
Obviously, these, as well as other potential alternative measurement methods, are costly but
they should be compared with the costs of the current systems of collecting students’ opinions
about teachers, which are often non trivial.
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39Tables
Table 1: Structure of degree programs
MANAGEMENT ECONOMICS LAW&MANAG.
Term I Management I Management I Management I
Private law Private law Mathematics
Mathematics Mathematics
Term II Microeconomics Microeconomics Accounting
Public law Public law
Accounting Accounting
Term III Management II Management II Management II
Macroeconomics Macroeconomics Statistics
Statistics Statistics
Term IV Business law Financial mathematics Accounting II
Manag. of Public Administrations Public economics Fiscal law
Financial mathematics Business law Financial mathematics
Human resources management
Term V Banking Econometrics Corporate ﬁnance
Corporate ﬁnance Economic policy
Management of industrial ﬁrms




Term VII Corporate strategy
Term VIII Business law II
The colors indicate the subject area the courses belong to: red=management, black=economics,
green=quantitative, blue=law. Only compulsory courses are displayed.
40Table 2: Descriptive statistics of degree programs
Term
Variable I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Management
No. Courses 3 3 3 4 3 4 1 -
No. Classes 24 21 23 26 23 27 12 -
Avg. Class Size 129.00 147.42 134.61 138.6 117.5 133.5 75.1 -
SD Class Size 73.13 80.57 57.46 100.06 16.64 46.20 11.89 -
Economics
No. Courses 3 3 3 3 2 1 - -
No. Classes 24 21 23 4 2 2 - -
Avg. Class Size 129.00 147.42 134.61 98.3 131.0 65.5 - -
SD Class Size 73.13 80.57 57.46 37.81 0 37.81 - -
Law & Management
No. Courses 3 4 4 4 2 - - 1
No. Classes 5 5 5 6 3 - - 1
Avg. Class Size 104.4 139.2 139.2 116 116 - - 174
SD Class Size 39.11 47.65 47.67 44.96 50.47 - - 0
41Table 3: Descriptive statistics of students
Variable Management Economics Law &Management Total
1=female 0.408 0.427 0.523 0.427
1=outside Milana 0.620 0.748 0.621 0.634
1=top Income Bracketb 0.239 0.153 0.368 0.248
1=academic high schoolc 0.779 0.794 0.684 0.767
1=late enrolleed 0.014 0.015 0.011 0.014
High-school grade (0-100) 86.152 93.053 88.084 87.181
(10.905) (8.878) (10.852) (10.904)
Entry Test Score (0-100) 50.615 52.415 48.772 50.544
(28.530) (31.752) (29.902) (29.084)
University Grades (0-30) 25.684 27.032 25.618 25.799
(3.382) (2.938) (3.473) (3.379)
Wage (Euro)e 966.191 1,012.241 958.381 967.964
(260.145) (265.089) (198.437) (250.367)
Number of students 901 131 174 1,206
a Dummy equal to one if the student’s place of residence at the time of ﬁrst enrollment is outside the
province of Milan (which is where Bocconi university is located).
b Family income is recorded in brackets and the dummy is equal to one for students who report incomes in
the top bracket, whose lower threshold is in the order of approximately 110,000 euros at current prices.
c Dummy equal to one if the student attended a academic high school, such as a lyceum, rather than
professional or vocational schools.
d Dummy equal to one if the student enrolled at Bocconi after age 19.
e Nominal value at current (2010) prices. Based on 391 observations for Management, 36 observations for
Economics, 94 observations for Law&Management, i.e. 521 observations overall.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of students’ evaluations
Management Economics Law&Manag. Total
Variable mean mean mean mean
(std.dev.) (std.dev.) (std.dev.) (std.dev.)
Overall teaching qualitya 7.103 7.161 6.999 7.115
(0.956) (0.754) (1.048) (0.900)
Lecturing clarityb 3.772 3.810 3.683 3.779
(0.476) (0.423) (0.599) (0.467)
Teacher generates interesta 6.800 6.981 6.915 6.864
(0.905) (0.689) (1.208) (0.865)
Course logisticb 3.683 3.641 3.617 3.666
(0.306) (0.266) (0.441) (0.303)
Course workloadb 2.709 2.630 2.887 2.695
(0.461) (0.542) (0.518) (0.493)
a Scores range from 0 to 10.
b Scores range from 1 to 5.
See Table A-4 for the exact wording of the evaluation questions.
42Table 5: Randomness checks - Students
Female Academic High Entry Top Outside Late
High School Test Income Milan Enrolleesa
Schoola Grade Score Bracketa
Management
F-stat 1.110 1.052 1.074 1.082 1.248 1.753 0.132
P-value 0.208 0.341 0.286 0.266 0.043 0.000 0.999
Economics
F-stat 3.592 0.931 1.684 1.488 0.649 1.027 0.109
P-value 0.000 0.616 0.007 0.031 0.969 0.441 0.999
Law & Management
F-stat 1.766 0.664 0.510 0.382 0.527 0.765 0.338
P-value 0.109 0.679 0.801 0.890 0.787 0.598 0.916
a See notes to Table 4.
The reported statistics are derived from regressions of the observable students’
characteristics (by column) on class dummies and the full interaction of indicators for the
degree program and the course (with standard errors clustered at the level of the individual
student). The reported statistics test the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcients on all the class
dummies are all jointly equal to zero. Management: 21 courses, 156 classes; Economics:
11 courses, 72 classes; Law & Management: 7 courses, 14 classes. Total: 38 courses, 230
classes.
43Table 6: Randomness checks - Teachers
F-test P-value
Class sizea 1.26 0.253
Attendanceb 0.59 0.809
Avg. high school grade 0.93 0.496
Avg. entry test score 0.47 0.894
Share of females 0.70 0.709
Share of students from outside Milanc 0.36 0.954
Share of top-income studentsc 1.16 0.319
Share academic high schoolc 1.88 0.050
Share late enrolleesc 0.89 0.530
Share of high abilityd 0.81 0.607
Morning lectures e 2.76 0.003
Evening lectures f 1.73 0.079
Joint signiﬁcance 1.17 0.119
The reported statistics are derived from a system of 9 seemingly unrelated simultaneous
equations, where each observation is a class in a compulsory course (184 observations in total).
The dependent variables are 9 teachers’ characteristics (age, gender, h-index, average citations
per year and 4 dummies for academic positions) and the regressors are the class characteristics
listed in the table. The reported statistics test the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcients on each
class characteristic are all jointly equal to zero in all the equations of the system. The last row
tests the hypothesis that the coefﬁcients on all regressors are all jointly zero in all equations. All
tests are distributed according to a F-distribution with (9,1467) degrees of freedom, apart from
the joint test in the last row, which has (108,1467) degrees of freedom.
a Number or ofﬁcially enrolled students.
b Attendance is monitored by random visits of university attendants to the class.
c See notes to Table 4.
d Share of students in the top 25% of the entry test score distribution.
e Share of lectures taught between 8.30 and 10.30 a.m.
f Share of lectures taught between 4.30 and 6.30 p.m.
44Table 7: Determinants of class effects
Dependent variable = b s [1] [2]a [3]
Class sizeb -0.001*** - -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Avg. high school grade 13.026*** - 11.692***
(1.660) (1.545)
Avg. entry test score 0.009 - -0.061
(0.108) (0.098)
Share of females 0.128 - -0.591
(0.417) (0.396)
Share from outside Milanb -0.667* - -0.404
(0.356) (0.320)
Share of top incomeb -0.894* - -0.628
(0.481) (0.443)
Share from academic high schoolsb 1.056** - -0.159
(0.504) (0.503)
Share of late enrolleesb -0.315 - 0.820
(1.493) (1.377)
Share of high abilityb 1.616** - 1.113*
(0.690) (0.623)
Morning lecturesb 0.019 - -0.023
(0.068) (0.065)
Evening lecturesb 0.364 - -0.146
(0.831) (0.802)
1=coordinator - -0.013 0.078
(0.074) (0.067)
Male - -0.035 -0.030
(0.046) (0.040)
Age - -0.051*** -0.043***
(0.007) (0.007)
Age squared - 0.001*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
H-index - -0.026** -0.021**
(0.012) (0.010)
Citations per year - 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Full professorc - 0.352*** 0.174
(0.128) (0.123)
Associate professorc - 0.280** 0.164
(0.121) (0.115)
Assistant professorc - 0.237** 0.174
(0.118) (0.114)
Degree program dummies yes yes yes
Subject area dummies yes yes yes
Term dummies yes yes yes
Partial R squared 0.424 0.358 0.570
Observations 230 230 230
Observations are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the estimated ’s. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05,***p<0.01
a Weighted averages of individual characteristics if there is more than one teacher per class.
b See notes to Table 6.
c All variables regarding the academic position refer to the main teacher of the class. The excluded dummy is a
residual category (visiting prof., external experts, collaborators.)
d R squared computed once program, term and subject ﬁxed effects are partialled out.
45Table 8: Descriptive statistics of estimated teacher effectiveness
Management Economics Law & Management Total
PANEL A: Std. dev. of estimated teacher effect
mean 0.160 0.144 0.220 0.174
minimum 0.067 0.003 0.040 0.003
maximum 0.235 0.244 0.330 0.330
PANEL B: Largest minus smallest class effect
mean 0.437 0.204 0.552 0.427
minimum 0.213 0.004 0.056 0.004
maximum 0.601 0.345 0.969 0.969
No. of courses 20 11 7 38
No. of classes 144 72 14 230
Teacher effectiveness is estimated by regressing the estimated class effects () on
observable class and teacher’s characteristics (see Table 7).
Table 9: Comparison of benchmark, subject and contem-
poraneous teacher effects





Program ﬁxed effects yes yes
Term ﬁxed effects yes yes
Subject ﬁxed effects yes yes
Observations 212 230
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Observations are
weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the dependent






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































47Table 11: Robustness check for class switching
Overall teaching quality Lecturing clarity
[1] [2] [3] [4]
PANEL A: All courses
Benchmark teacher effects -0.410* - -0.210** -
(0.226) (0.121)
Contemporaneous teacher effects - 0.273*** - 0.136***
(0.061) (0.030)
Observations 230 230 230 230
PANEL B: Excluding most switched course
Benchmark teacher effects -0.459* - -0.211* -
(0.259) (0.119)
Contemporaneous teacher effects - 0.284*** - 0.137***
(0.067) (0.035)
Observations 222 222 222 222
PANEL C: Excluding most and second most switched course
Benchmark teacher effects -0.367 - -0.172 -
(0.291) (0.126)
Contemporaneous teacher effects - 0.262*** - 0.128***
(0.073) (0.034)
Observations 214 214 214 214
PANEL D: Excluding ﬁve most switched courses
Benchmark teacher effects -0.474 - -0.186 -
(0.292) (0.124)
Contemporaneous teacher effects - 0.212*** - 0.089**
(0.082) (0.041)
Observations 176 176 176 176
Weighted OLS estimates. Observations are weighted by the squared root of the number of collected
questionnaires in each class.
Additional regressors: teacher characteristics (gender and coordinator status), class characteristics
(class size, attendance, average high school grade, average entry test score, share of high ability
students, share of students from outside Milan, share of top-income students), degree program
dummies, term dummies, subject area dummies.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
48Table 12: Teacher effectiveness and students evaluations by share
of high ability students
Presence of high-ability students
all >0.22 >0.25
[1] [2] [3]
PANEL A: Overall teaching quality
Teaching effectiveness -0.410* -0.426 -0.088
(0.227) (0.336) (0.329)
PANEL B: Lecturing clarity
Teaching effectiveness -0.210* -0.210 -0.059
(0.121) (0.159) (0.165)
Observations 230 172 115
Weighted OLS estimates. Observations are weighted by the squared root of
the number of collected questionnaires in each class.
Additional regressors: teacher characteristics (gender and coordinator
status), class characteristics (class size, attendance, average high school
grade, average entry test score, share of high ability students, share of
students from outside Milan, share of top-income students), degree program
dummies, term dummies, subject area dummies.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
49Appendix
Figure A-1: Excerpt of student questionnaire
50Table A-1: Descriptive statistics of estimated class effects
Management Economics Law & Management Total
Std. dev. of estimated class effects
mean 0.055 0.160 0.033 0.082
minimum 0.027 0.066 0.000 0.000
maximum 0.087 0.246 0.087 0.246
Largest minus smallest class effect
mean 0.156 0.433 0.047 0.216
minimum 0.043 0.108 0.000 0.000
maximum 0.248 0.748 0.122 0.748
No. of courses 20 11 7 38
No. of classes 144 72 14 230
Table A-2: Descriptive statistics of subject teacher effectiveness
Management Economics Law & Management Total
PANEL A: Std. dev. of estimated teacher effects
mean 0.087 0.245 0.108 0.138
minimum 0.050 0.000 0.034 0.000
maximum 0.146 0.319 0.156 0.319
PANEL B: Largest minus smallest teacher effect
mean 0.248 0.744 0.153 0.374
minimum 0.154 0.001 0.048 0.001
maximum 0.345 1.048 0.221 1.048
No. of courses 17 10 7 34
No. of classes 128 70 14 212
51Table A-3: Descriptive statistics of contemporaneous teacher effectiveness
Management Economics Law & Management Total
PANEL A: Std. dev. of estimated teacher effects
mean 0.177 0.311 0.155 0.212
minimum 0.041 0.197 0.001 0.001
maximum 0.305 0.568 0.323 0.568
PANEL B: Largest minus smallest teacher effect
mean 0.493 0.801 0.220 0.532
minimum 0.106 0.278 0.002 0.002
maximum 0.989 1.560 0.456 1.560
No. of courses 20 11 7 38
No. of classes 144 72 14 230
Table A-4: Wording of the evaluation questions
Overall teaching quality On a scale 0 to 10, provide your overall evaluation
of the course you attended in terms of quality of the
teaching.
Clarity of the lectures On a scale 1 to 5, where 1 means complete disagree-
ment and 5 complete agreement, indicate to what
extent you agree with the following statement: the
speech and the language of the teacher during the lec-
tures are clear and easily understandable.
Ability in generating interest
for the subject
On a scale 0 to 10, provide your overall evaluation
about the teacher’s ability in generating interest for
the subject
Logistics of the course On a scale 1 to 5, where 1 means complete disagree-
ment and 5 complete agreement, indicate to what
extent you agree with the following statement: the
course has been carried out coherently with the ob-
jectives, the content and the schedule that were com-
municated to us at the beginning of the course by the
teacher.
Workload of the course On a scale 1 to 5, where 1 means complete disagree-
ment and 5 complete agreement, indicate to what
extent you agree with the following statement: the
amount of study materials required for the prepara-
tion of the exam has been realistically adequate to
the objective of learning and sitting the exams of all
courses of the term.
52Table A-5: Correlations between evaluations items
Overall teaching Lecturing Teacher generates Course Course





Teacher generates 0.697 0.536 1.000
interest
Course 0.742 0.698 0.506 1.000
logistics
Course 0.124 0.122 0.193 0.094 1.000
workload
Figure A-2: Economics and Management common courses - Benchmark teacher effectiveness
53